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Abstract
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The authors estimate the effect on business start-ups of 
a program that significantly speeds up firm registration 
procedures. The program was implemented in Mexico 
in different municipalities at different dates. Authors 
estimates suggest that new start-ups increased by about 
4 percent in eligible industries, and the authors present 
evidence that this is a causal effect. Most of the effect 
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is temporary, concentrated in the first 10 months 
after implementation. The effect is robust to several 
specifications of the benchmark control group time 
trends. The authors find that the program was more 
effective in municipalities with less corruption and 
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11 Introduction
Firm creation has been believed to be an important channel of GDP growth at least
since Joseph Schumpeter. In addition to expanding the range of products, entry can create
more competition, lower prices for consumers, and may lead to better technology adoption.
Changes in the status of existing rms from informal to formal may also have important
eects on GDP growth: it is likely that informal rms have less secure property rights and
thus lower than optimal investment and productivity growth, leading to lower prots and
value added.
The ability to start a rm, however, is limited by several factors including the burden of
complying with government regulations. Excessive governmental regulations can provide an
incentive to operate in the informal sector. Government regulation also may prevent some
entrepreneurs from operating at all since there are inherent disadvantages of operating
in the informal sector. The negative correlation between GDP growth and measures of
the burden of rm entry regulation that some cross country studies have found could be
rationalized by both of these eects.1
But how burdensome is regulation really? Based on data from 85 countries Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) nd a considerable burden on the en-
trepreneur looking to register a rm with the appropriate authorities: the average number
of procedures required to start a rm around the world is 10, the average number of days
is 47, and the ocial cost of following these procedures for a simple rm is 47 percent of
annual per capita income. Djankov et al. (2002) conclude that for an entrepreneur in most
countries, legal entry is extremely cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive. Further-
more, the authors nd that \stricter" regulation of entry is associated with sharply higher
levels of corruption, and a greater relative size of the unocial economy. As a result `high
regulation' countries may have low levels of tax collection, a heavy tax burden on formal
rms, and `unfair' competition from informal rms since they do not pay taxes.
In this paper we suppose that there are benets to operating in the formal sector, but
rms may be reluctant to register and become formal if registration is too costly. We address
two main questions. First, does a decrease in rm start-up costs lead to a permanent
increase in rm start-ups? Second, does this eect operate through the registration of
existing informal rms or through the creation of truly new rms?
1See for example Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho (2006a) Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006). Djankov
et al. (2006a) create an index of the burden of regulation based on average country rankings in the World
Bank's \Doing Business" indicators. They nd that countries that are in the highest (best) quartile of
this index grow 2.3 percentage points faster than countries in the lowest (worst) quartile. This eect is
more than twice the eect on GDP growth of going from the second quartile to the highest quartile in
terms of primary school enrollment. The authors stress that reforms such as a \one-stop shop" for business
registration could accelerate GDP growth.
2There are without a doubt many factors that inuence a rm's decision to become
formal besides the time and eort cost of going through the formal registration procedures.
The tax liability of formal sector rms, combined with the requirement to comply with
health and safety regulations, may be crucial in deterring rm formalization. The most
cited potential benets of being formal involve government protection of property rights,
ease of transacting with other rms, and better access to credit for the rm (see Straub
(2005)).
The magnitude of the eect of lower registration costs on rm start-ups is therefore
an empirical issue. If the main reason that rms choose to be informal is the desire to
evade taxes, making registration procedures more ecient would likely have little impact.
It is also possible that entrepreneurs are able to avoid the \excessive" regulations through
bribes, thus eectively reducing the impact of regulation. Finally it is possible that the most
important constraint on rm creation is the availability of credit or other complementary
inputs; the scarcity of credit may limit rm creation and also negate one of the often cited
advantages of becoming formal.
However, in spite of the multitude of barriers to formal rm creation, there has been
considerable emphasis on the diculty of complying with all of the regulations required
to open a rm in developing countries (see WorldBank (2006), Economist (2004), De Soto
(1989), and Easterly (2006)).2 As a result of the increased concern about burdensome
governmental regulations, many countries have implemented reforms designed to simplify
the process of registering and opening a rm. According to the World Bank's 2006 p.13
Doing Business Report \following (rm registration) reform, new entry jumped by 28% in
Vietnam, 22% in Romania and 16% in Belgium" and 42% in Serbia and Montenegro."
To estimate the magnitude of the eect of reducing registration procedures we use
variation induced by the implementation of a \deregulation" program (SARE) that took
place in Mexico in dierent locations at dierent time periods. This program instituted
`one-stop' rm registration oces in some municipalities. These rm registration oces
allowed small rms that operate in eligible industries to obtain a licence to operate in two
days or less. Before the program was implemented it took about 30 days to go through the
municipal registration procedures. The decrease in the delay brought by SARE is equivalent
to the dierence in delay between Jamaica vs Canada (according to Djankov et al. (2002)).
Although SARE signicantly reduces the time to obtain the business license, SARE
does not aect other potentially burdensome procedures. For example, an entrepreneur
typically must already have registered with the tax authorities prior to beginning the pro-
cess. Further, SARE does not aect the various inspections to which formal rms are
2In 2003 the donors in the International Development Association and the United States' Millennium
Challenge Account made grant eligibility conditional on performance on the time and cost of business
start-up.
3subjected. It may be that rms are particularly vulnerable to the solicitation of bribes
during these inspections.
The fact that SARE represents a signicant, but less than complete reform of the
business climate makes SARE an interesting program to evaluate. The reforms cited in
the Doing Business reports have been much more comprehensive and apparently have had
dramatic eects. Since we nd a much more modest eect on rm registration for the
SARE program, one would conjecture that reforms of the business climate are indeed
complementary and must be implemented together in order to realize benets like the
ones documented in the Doing Business reports. In fact, we present direct evidence that
SARE's eect on rm creation has been bigger in municipalities that appear otherwise to
have healthier business climates.
Although the timing of introduction of the program and the industries to which it
applied was not random, we provide some evidence that implementation was not related
to time varying covariates or lagged outcomes. Instead, political aliation and the year
of tenure of the municipality major are signicant predictors of adoption. We also use
dierent control groups and sources of variation to identify the program's eect, and nd
that our results are robust to dierent specications. To our knowledge no program of the
type we study has been implemented randomly across cities or regions, probably because a
randomized implementation is likely to be politically infeasible. It is therefore likely that
evidence on the eectiveness of these programs will always come from non-randomized
implementations like the one we study.
In our analysis, we will use two dierent identication strategies: the rst compares
rm start-ups before and after implementation of the program in municipalities with the
program vs. municipalities without it. Our second (and preferred) identication strategy
is motivated by a concern that the timing of SARE adoption may be systematically related
to factors that are also correlated with the time trend of economic conditions in those
municipalities. This could happen if, for example, the government implements the program
in bigger municipalities rst and macroeconomic conditions aect them dierently.
To avoid relying entirely on cross municipality comparisons our preferred estimation
strategy compares the time trend of new business creation for industries aected by SARE
to the time trend for exempted industries in the same municipality. This later strategy is
a `within' municipality comparison that is robust to some potential problems of selection
of municipalities and municipality specic shocks.
Our preferred estimates imply that the program generated a 4% increase on monthly
new rm start-ups. This increase in the ow of rm registration appears to be temporary
and concentrated in the rst ten months after implementation, leading us to conjecture
that the program mostly aects the existing stock of informal rms and has a smaller eect
4on the creation of \truly" new rms. The eect is not present for job creation in continuing
rms nor is it present for the creation of rms with more than 10 employees. Since the
deregulation program does not aect continuing rms and does not apply to large rms,
these latter two facts bolster our claim that the eects on rms creation that we estimate
are the causal eects of the program.
The World Bank and many governments have high expectations for programs of the
type we study as promoters of economic development. We therefore pay special attention
to the magnitude of the eect we estimate. The size of our estimated eect is only about
one quarter of the eect that the Doing Business Report (2006 p.13) documents and about
5% of what the Mexican authorities report as outcome of the program. We oer some
conjectures as to why the eect has been modest. In particular, we oer evidence that
other barriers to rm creation limit the eectiveness of the deregulation program we study.
There have been some previous papers that pose questions related to ours. The main
diculty of these papers is to establish a causal relationship between the regulatory burden
and economic outcomes. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) study how variation across time in
the toughness (rejection rates) of the application of zoning restrictions had an impact on
employment growth; they use the political party composition of the approving board as an
instrument for time variation in rejection rates. Djankov et al. (2006a) instrument their
index of regulatory burden with a legal origin variable and with geographic and cultural
variables in an attempt to establish causality from regulation to GDP growth.
Our paper complements this existing literature by using a more transparent source of
variation induced by the staggered implementation of a government program for selected
industries. Apart from using a dierent methodology, our paper has important implications
for policy makers today. Although deregulation programs of the type that we study have
been in place for some years and pressure for their implementation has caused more than one
hundred countries to carry out these reforms, there is scant evidence of their eects and of
the determinants of their eectiveness. This paper makes a contribution towards measuring
the eect of one of these programs, Mexico's \System of Fast Opening of Firms" (or SARE
for its initials in Spanish), which shares many of the characteristics with `deregulation'
programs in other countries.
Miriam Bruhn (2006) has independently (and simultaneously) evaluated the eects of
SARE using household data. We believe that our paper has several key advantages. Our
data covers a longer time period, allowing us to study longer term eects of the program.
The fact that our data covers a longer time period, combined with the fact the we use census
data, allows us to study 59 more SARE implementations than studied by Bruhn (almost 3
times more) and avoid the problems of survey representativeness that she faces. Moreover
we use actual registration data instead of survey responses. Finally, we provide a more
5careful analysis of the validity of our identication strategy, which includes an analysis
of the determinants of program adoption. This analysis leads us to rely more on cross
industry comparisons while controlling for municipality trends as opposed to a dierence
in dierence strategy comparing municipalities directly. Due to the numerous dierences
between the two papers, we view our papers as complementary.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will describe the program we study
and the setting in which it was implemented. Section 3 will describe our data sources and
our outcome variables. Section 4 will describe our two empirical strategies and analyze some
determinants of program implementation. Our main results, specication and robustness
checks are in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 presents some conjectures on why the program
has not been as eective as expected. Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Setting
and Description of the Program
2.1 The Informal Sector and the Regulatory Burden in Mexico
How big is the informal sector in Mexico? Using the ILO denition of informal sector
employment the Mexican Statistical Institute (INEGI) reports that, in the year 2000, 23%
of the employed population worked in the informal sector. The share of GDP produced by
the informal sector is 12.5% (which implies that the informal sector produces less output
per worker). Schneider and Enste (2000) report higher numbers: the percentage of GDP
produced in the informal sector is between 27% and 49% depending on the method used to
measure it. In particular it is higher than in Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and
Venezuela, among others.
Not only does Mexico have a big informal sector but, consistent with the `Burdensome
Regulation View', Mexico also was among the countries with more lengthy rm registration
procedures, ranking 69 out of 85 countries studied by Djankov et al. (2002), taking 67 days
to register a rm. This is higher than Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and
Brazil.
Spurred in part by this poor performance, in March 2002 the Federal government in
Mexico, through its oce of the \Federal Commission of Regulatory Improvement" (COFE-
MER), implemented a program called \System of Fast Opening of Firms" (SARE for its
initials in Spanish) to reduce the number of administrative procedures and time required
to register a rm and make these procedures more transparent (in some instances the
monetary cost was also reduced).
62.2 Description of the Program
SARE is a Federal level program that ensures \that micro, small and medium rms,
which carry no risk for health and environment, can register and open in two days after
ling with the municipality's SARE oce. It aims to achieve this objective by consolidating
Federal, State and Municipal3 procedures to register and operate a rm in one municipal
oce, capping the number of mandatory Federal procedures at only two. SARE requires
municipality governments to issue the operation licence in at most 48 hours assuming that
industry eligibility and zoning requirements are satised. The program eectively per-
mits operation of the rm while postponing federal inspections and requirements for three
months after registering with the Federal Tax Authority. SARE not only speeds up regis-
tration but also clearly denes the procedures, fees and identities of the entities involved in
the registration process, thus making the procedure more transparent and making it harder
for bureaucrats to delay the process in search for bribes.
SARE is not operated by the Federal government. SARE is operated by the munici-
palities and each municipality is responsible for publicizing the program and maintaining
high standards of eciency and service. Since municipalities in Mexico can enact regula-
tion about zoning restrictions, rm operation permits, health standards for rms, and civil
protection issues among others, they have substantial control and inuence on rm registra-
tion. It is for this reason that municipalities are believed to be the main bottleneck in the
process of rm registration. Additionally, since many revision and compliance checks are
conducted by municipality governments, it is commonly believed that most corruption re-
lated to rm registration occurs at the municipality level. For these reasons, municipalities
are the main target of the SARE program.
In order to implement the program interested municipalities voluntarily sign a contract
with COFEMER in which COFEMER agrees to provide the expertise and training to the
municipality personnel. The municipality, in turn, agrees to provide the personnel, physical
space, technology, and funds to implement and continually operate the program. After
the signing of the contract, COFEMER ocials visit the municipality and remain there
until the SARE oce is fully operational, with all procedures in place and the objective
of registering a rm in two days met. From this point on, COFEMER plays a limited
supervisory role, verifying that the standards continue to be met. Failure to maintain the
standards can result in the public removal of the \SARE" label from the municipality. The
municipality also reserves the right to withdraw from SARE at anytime. Neither of these
events has happened since the program's inception.
It is important to note that not all rms can register and obtain a licence through
3A municipality (\municipio") is the smallest autonomous entity of the federal system in Mexico. It is
typically bigger than a city, but many big cities contain two or more municipalities.
7SARE. The Federal government selected 685 \non-risky" 6-digit industries as eligible for
the program, that is, only rms in industries that pose little health or environmental threats
can register through SARE. The rationale for selecting only these industries is that the of-
cials did not want to reduce oversight for rms prone to accidents or for rms prone to
health hazards. As a result of these criteria, the retail and services sectors are dispropor-
tionately represented as eligible industries. Some examples of eligible industries include:
production of metal and wooden furniture, freezing of fruits and vegetables, production
of clothes and textiles, drugstores and small supermarkets, video stores and DVD rentals,
real estate services, etc. Examples of non-eligible industries include: bars, production of
rubber products, hospitals, production of machinery, etc.4 Although each municipality was
encouraged to select all of these 685 industries, most included only a subset of this list. De-
spite having considerable autonomy, municipalities tended to select the same industries as
eligible, mostly copying their lists from other municipalities that already had implemented
the program.
Firms that satisfy the eligibility criteria must register through SARE; unjustied rejec-
tions are illegal. More importantly for our purposes, rms cannot register in one munic-
ipality and operate in another, thus enabling us to estimate SARE's eect by comparing
outcomes in a municipality with SARE to those in municipalities without it. Since the
mean number of employees of a rm registering through SARE is 2.6 employees, we believe
that rms are most likely single establishment entities. There were no other government
programs being implemented with a similar location-time prole, that is, there were no
government induced policies whose eects we could be attributing to SARE.
2.3 Implementation of SARE
Mexico has 2448 municipalities and 32 States. The Federal government wanted to imple-
ment this program rst where it could have the greatest impact. It used a study by Cabrero,
Ziccardi and Orihuela (2003) in which 60 major urban centers were identied based on qual-
ity of infrastructure, population, economic activity, and growth potential. These centers
encompass 224 municipalities which, following COFEMER, we will call \Competitive Mu-
nicipalities." The government has focused its eorts on convincing these municipalities to
adopt SARE, but it cannot deny participation to any other municipality. Competitive
municipalities form what is commonly known as the \intention-to-treat" group, SARE was
supposed to be implemented in all of them by the end of 2006, although this goal was not
achieved. The program could not be implemented simultaneously in all locations mostly
because of COFEMER's limited resources. In our sample period, which extends from Jan-
4For a detailed list please consult COFEMER's web page at
http://www.cofemer.gob.mx/portal.asp?seleccionID=22&padreID=10&hijoID 65#sicas.
8uary 1998 to March 2006, we observe 93 municipalities implementing SARE, 31 of these are
not \Competitive" municipalities. These municipalities are smaller and asked for SARE
without COFEMER's encouragement.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Municipalities Implementing SARE 2 8 28 47 8
Number of municipalities implementing in 
the most active State*
121 09 3
Number of States implementing 2 7 15 17 7
Non Competitive Municipalities 0 0 11 16 4
SARE adoption by year**: Timing, Geographical Breath and Municipality Clustering
* The State with more SARE implementing municipalities in a particular year. **Implementation within our sample period.
Table 1: SARE Adoption: Timing, Geographical Breath and Municipality Clustering
Table 1 presents statistics on the timing, geographical variation, and clustering of SARE
adoption during our sample period. The rst row shows the number of municipalities that
adopted the program in each year. The second row shows that municipalities within a
state tended to implement at the same time; in 2004 more than a third of implementation
happened in one state (the state where the President of Mexico came from), for 2005
about one fth of implementation came from the most active state. The third row of the
table depicts the number of states where implementation took place. SARE adoption has
substantial geographic variation: out of a total of 32 states SARE was implemented in 31
of them during the sample period. The last row counts the number of non-competitive
municipalities that implemented. Since they were not explicitly invited, they typically
implemented later.
Large municipalities were explicitly targeted for early program adoption. Table 2
presents summary statistics of Mexican municipalities for a partition of four non-intersecting
groups: municipalities with SARE in our sample period, \Competitive" non SARE mu-
nicipalities, municipalities without SARE that are geographically adjacent to a SARE mu-
nicipality, and all others. It shows that SARE municipalities are much bigger in terms of
employment, new rm creation and population than the other three groups. They also have
a higher share of registered employees and a higher proportion of workers in the tertiary
sector. It should be noted that Mexico City did not adopt the program during our sample
period.
Although the government neither randomly selected the municipalities that would im-
plement the program, nor the industries that would be eligible, discussions with COFE-
MER ocials, surveys to the municipality ocials and the analysis that we present here
convinced us that the decision to implement the program was not related to lagged values
of our outcome variables nor to expected future values of these.
9Variable SARE Competitive Adjacent Other
Employment***   61,450      
(85,672)
13,213        
(23,578)
1,446      
(3,040)
1,420      
(4,019)
Monthly New jobs by new firms***  409         
(478)
99            
(188)
16         
(49)
15         
(71)
Monthly New firms  (mean)***   111         
(118)
26            
(48)
4          
(9)
4          
(11)
Non-Exiting Firms*** 3,620       
(4,367)
786           
(1,455)
131        
(248)
117        
(285)
Population** 1,332,588    
(1,356,585)
504,958       
(829,175)
120,846    
(108,289)
101,024    
(115,520)
% of Working Population with IMSS** 10%        
(5%)
7%           
(8%)
3%        
(4%)
3%        
(7%)
% Workers in Terciary Sector** 54%        
(13%)
53%          
(12%)
34%       
(10%)
35%       
(13%)
Number of Establishments* 11,518      
(12,573)
4,089         
(6,760)
751        
(873)
685        
(1,019)
Production* $2,388      
($3,071)
$846          
($2,346)
$100       
($487)
$59        
($296)
Number of Municipalities 93 142 267 1,008
Means and Std. Dev. by Type of Municipality (monthly averages)
*As reported in the economic census 2004 (millons of 2004 dollars); ** From the Population Census 2000; *** From our 
IMSS dataset (averages 1998-2001).  Means with Standard Deviations in parenthesis.
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Type of Municipality
Most of the implementation was done where the Federal Government could convince
the state governments that there was excessive regulation at the municipality level and by
promising to give technical advice and methodology to improve regulation. The state gov-
ernors in turn convinced municipality mayors. This may explain the within State clustering
of implementation, although regional shocks could also be an explanation. This convincing
appears to have been more eective for municipality mayors who belonged to the same
party as the President, those who were in the middle of their term, and those from a state
where other municipalities were implementing the program.
In the rst three years of implementation more than 70% of the municipalities were
from the President's party (PAN) at the moment of implementation. While in our whole
population of municipalities only about 25.4% of the municipalities are governed by this
party.5 In our sample period more than 50% of municipalities implement in the mayor's
5We counted the number of municipality-months that each party was in power from January 2002 to
March 2006. The shares are PAN=25.4%, PRI=53.3%, PRD=16.7%, others=5%. These shares are similar
when we look within years.
10second year of tenure (municipality mayors have three year terms), and we nd that there
is clustering of implementation within a State.
Since municipalities are autonomous entities, implementation of the program is largely
a political issue. This means that it is extremely dicult randomize implementation with
the purpose of evaluation, but more importantly it could imply that implementation is
not correlated with the outcomes the program is intended to change. If this is indeed the
case then our estimates of the program's eect would be unbiased. Section 4.1 performs
an analysis of the determinants of the timing of adoption and conrms that most of the
political determinants mentioned above are signicant predictions of program adoption,
and that past levels of rm and job creation are not important determinants of adoption.
3 Description of the Data
We will use three sources of data: (i) data from the Mexican Institute of Statistics,
Geography and Informatics (INEGI); (ii) contracts of the Federal government with 31 of
the 93 municipalities that implemented the program; and (iii) proprietary data from the
Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS).6
The rst source of data is from Mexico's Statistical Institute (INEGI). These data in-
clude municipality demographics from the Mexican Population Census (2000), municipality
production data from the Mexican Economic Census (2004) and data about political vari-
ables from INEGI's municipal databases. The second source of data is from the \Federal
Commission for Regulatory Improvement" (COFEMER), the Federal government agency
in charge of SARE. We collected surveys from COFEMER ocials regarding reasons for
the dierent timing of SARE implementation as well as main obstacles for the program's
adoption in each municipality. Finally we used contracts between COFEMER and 31
municipalities that have implemented SARE. These contracts contain the lists of eligible
industries as well as documentation about the SARE registration procedures.
The third data source is a data set from the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS).
IMSS is the Mexican equivalent of the US Social Security and one of the main providers of
health services for registered employees. In this paper, we use data taken from the last day
of each month from January 1998 through March 2006. We use a census of establishments
that have employees registered with the Institute. Registration of all employees is required
by law, although it is well known that establishments do not always comply with this law.
This means that what we use as our measure of outcomes is not necessarily new rms,
6We considered using Mexican household data (the ENE). These data, however, are not representative
at the municipality level. They also suer from the problem that one can only observe where a person
lives; one cannot observe where the person works or the location of the business the person operates.
11but rather the number of new formally registered rms. Since we observe all registered
workers for each establishment, it is straightforward to count the number of employees in
each month in each establishment. Although we do not observe much information about
the establishments, we do observe the number of employees, their four-digit industry code
as well as the municipality in which the establishment operates.
A crucial part of our identication strategy will be to identify the industries that are
eligible for the SARE program and those that are not.7 Although there is some variation
in industry eligibility across municipalities, this variation is not substantial. As mentioned
above, we were given access to 31 contracts between COFEMER and municipalities that
have implemented SARE. Analyzing these contracts gave us 31 separate industry-eligibility
lists. Based on these lists we extrapolate industry eligibility to the remaining 62 SARE
municipalities using two denitions of industry eligibility. The rst is the \union" of eligible
industries. Using this denition, we classify an industry as being eligible if it appears on
the eligibility list of at least one of the 31 municipalities. The second is the \intersection" of
eligible industries. Using this denition, we declare an industry to be eligible if it appears
in all 31 industry-eligibility lists.
There are 30 four-digit industries in our intersection sample and 97 in the union. Our
results are quite similar with these two denitions of industry eligibility. FootnoteMeasure-
mentError discusses some concerns with this extrapolation. Nevertheless, it is important
to note that eligible industries include a bigger share of retail and services relative to man-
ufacturing. In particular eligible industries do not include agriculture, construction, and
manufacturing that involves chemicals or pollutants. Table 11 in the Appendix presents
the eligibility status of the 30 IMSS industries with the most rm creation.
Once we had the denitions of eligible industries, we aggregated the data at the mu-
nicipality level for each month, separately for establishments in eligible industries and for
establishments not in eligible industries. That is, for a given municipality in a given month,
we have two observations: one that aggregates the data for all eligible industries and an-
other that aggregates the data for all non-eligible industries. We created the following
variables:
i) Number of new establishments. This variable is the number of rms in the
current month with at least one employee that did not have any employees in the
previous month.
ii) Jobs created by new establishments. This variable is the current employment
7One complication is that the municipalities use an industry list from INEGI for the administration of
the program, while IMSS manages its own list of industries. We therefore had to construct a concordance
between these two lists of industries. Since the INEGI industry classication is more detailed than the IMSS
industry classication, we manually matched 685 6-digit INEGI industries to 302 4-digit IMSS industries.
12in rms that did not have any employees in the previous month.
iii) Jobs created by continuing establishments. Dene empljt to be employment in
establishment j in month t. Jobs created by continuing establishments is
max(0;empljt   empljt 1) for establishments in which empljt 1 > 0.
iv) Number of exiting establishments. This variable is the number of rms in the
current month with no employees that had at least one employee in the previous
month.
In addition to the concordance of INEGI and IMSS industries, we had to construct
a concordance between INEGI and IMSS municipalities. According to the INEGI clas-
sication there are 2448 municipalities in Mexico, since IMSS has a dierent method to
classify geographical areas we only have 1510 IMSS municipalities. The main dierence
is that IMSS often aggregates smaller municipalities together into a larger entity. Thus
we lose some INEGI municipalities for which we could not nd out their corresponding
IMSS municipality; these are mainly smaller municipalities. We do not lose any SARE
municipalities, although we lose 16 Competitive municipalities.
4 Empirical Strategy and Models
The main question we want to answer is the following: how big was the eect of SARE
on formal rm creation? To answer this question we need to estimate a counterfactual
scenario of what rm creation would have been in the absence of the program. This is
typically done by selecting a set of \control" municipalities that we expect would mimic
the performance that SARE municipalities would have had without SARE.8 Alternatively
we could use non-eligible industries as controls for eligible industries and compare the dif-
ference of rm creation within municipalities across the two sets of industries. In both
cases we assume that rm creation in the control municipalities (industries) are good ap-
proximations to what would have happened without the program in SARE municipalities
(eligible industries). Unfortunately the counterfactual identication assumptions used are
inherently not testable. We will use a series of checks to increase our condence that our
identication assumptions are reasonable and that our estimates are close to SARE's true
causal eect.
First, in section 4.1 we will show that there is no evidence that municipalities that
adopted the program do so because of changes in time varying covariates or lagged out-
comes. Instead we will show that political variables are more important determinants of
8Two recent papers which have similar settings as ours are Athey and Stern (2002) and Galiani, Gertler
and Schargrodsky (2005).
13adoption. This result is important since, as long as the political variables are not correlated
with the trends of rm creation, it is less likely that time-varying unobserved variables are
aecting the trends of rm creation dierentially for SARE municipalities. We nd no
correlation in the before-SARE period between rm or job creation and these political
variables: the raw correlation coecient is less than 0.02. This holds also if we control
for municipality xed eects. We also test if the trends of rm creation are parallel and
cannot reject that treatment and control groups have the same time trends before the
implementation of the program.
Second, we will use two sources of variation to identify the eect of SARE: comparing
across municipalities (section 5) and comparing across industries (section 6). We obtain
two dierent estimates and argue that if there is any bias in the estimation, the true
eect should be between these. For reasons we will discuss we believe that the estimates
comparing across industries are more reliable and we focus mostly on these in the paper.
Third, we will calculate our estimates for dierent denitions of industry eligibility and
show that municipalities' slight dierences in the choice of eligible industries are not driving
the results. Finally, we will report several specication and robustness checks in section
6.2.
4.1 Where is SARE implemented?
If factors aecting the time trends of rm creation are correlated with variables aecting
the decision to adopt the program, then it is likely that adopting municipalities would have
had a dierent trend in new rm creation compared to control municipalities even in the
absence of the program. If these factors are observed we can allow time trends to depend on
them and consistently estimate the eect of the program. However, if they are unobserved,
comparing rm creation of adopters vs. control municipalities before and after the program
will give us inconsistent estimates of the true eect of the program. A similar problem holds
if we compare eligible vs. non eligible industries: if adoption of the program is correlated
with future changes of the industry composition of new rm creation, and this change is
dierent for early and late SARE adopters, then our estimate of the causal eect will not
be consistent.
Given the above concerns, it is therefore informative to analyze the determinants of
implementation and to show that time varying covariates do not appear to be related to
adoption. The hope is that if time-varying observables are not correlated with implemen-
tation, time-varying unobservables will also be uncorrelated with adoption. We estimate
a discrete Weibull duration model of program implementation (as described in Jenkins
(1995)) and show that (static) political variables are a more important determinant of
the timing of adoption than time-varying economic variables. The political variables we
14use include: party of the municipality mayor (PRI, PAN, PRD) as well as the mayor's
tenure at the time of adoption (the excluded categories are other parties and coalitions
and the rst year of tenure, respectively); we also include as a regressor the number of
municipalities that have implemented in the State at any given time to capture the eect
of \recommendation" by the State governor.
The time varying economic variables we use are rm creation and job creation in con-
tinuing establishments. We remove seasonal and level eects that are common to all munic-
ipalities from these variables by regressing them on month and municipality xed eects.
We then use the residuals to construct one year moving averages. We use these moving
averages as regressors in the duration model. There are at least two reasons for doing this:
rst, since these variables are highly seasonal and serially correlated we could nd a spuri-
ous correlation if we use, say, the values of the last month or the last quarter. Secondly, we
believe that if there is any relationship at all between economic conditions and implemen-
tation, it should operate with a lag. Results are not changed if we do not de-trend these
variables.
The time constant regressors we use are demographic and economic municipality char-
acteristics from the 2000 Population Census, the 2004 Economic Census, and municipality
data bases collected by the Mexican Statistical Institute. These regressors are the fol-
lowing: total population (in thousands of individuals), production per capita (in millions
of 2000 dollars), unemployment, working age population (in thousands), percentage of the
workers in the tertiary sector, percentage of the working age population registered at IMSS,
the log of the state's exports in 2004 dollars, the percentage of employment in exporting
rms in the state, the percentage of the workers receiving no income, and gross income
(tax revenues plus federal transfers) of the municipality government (in millions of 2000
dollars).
Since the program was intended for competitive municipalities, in the estimation we
consider only SARE and Competitive (not-yet-SARE) municipalities as the `municipalities
at risk', and thus only those are included in the sample for the table. Table 3 shows the
results for two specications; they dier by whether we include past rm and total job
creation separately for eligible and non-eligible industries (specication (2)), or whether we
aggregated them (specication (1)). The coecients are reported in a exponential form so
that they can be interpreted as semi-elasticities of the hazard of implementation.
15(1) (2)
Weibull Duration dependence parameter 16.47***    
(4.4)
16.72***     
(4.29)
Party 1 (official) 0.27**      
(-2.1)
0.25**       
(-2.18)
Party 2 0.13***     
(-3.08)
0.16***      
(-2.83)
Party 3 0.19*       
(-1.71)
0.24         
(-1.44)
2nd Year of Tenure 2.9**       
(2.17)     
3.17**       
(2.31)
3rd Year of Tenure 2.1         
(1.50)
2.10         
(1.47)
Number of Mun. in State that 
implemented
1.26***     
(2.98)
1.26***      
(2.97)   
New Firm Creation                                   
(MA12, detrended)
1.008       
(0.45)
Job Creation                                          
(MA12, detrended)
1.0006      
(1.23)
New Firm Creation in Eligible 
Industries  (MA12, detrended)
1.01         
(0.53)
New Firm Creation in Non-Eligible 
Industries  (MA12, detrended)
0.97         
(-0.62)
Job Creation in Eligible Industries 
(MA12, detrended)
1.002        
(1.18)
Job Creation in non-Eligible Industries 
(MA12, detrended)
0.99         
(-0.53)
Total Population (thousands) 1.001       
(0.68)
1.002        
(1.31)
Production                                  
($dollars per capita)
1.00001     
(0.14)
1.00004      
(0.39)
Unemployment (2000 cenus) 1.26        
(0.85)
1.20         
(0.66)
Working Age Population (thousands) 0.99        
(-0.38)
0.99         
(-1.02)
% Employees in Tertiary Sector 1.09        
(0.14)
1.04         
(0.07)
% Working Age Registered at IMSS 1.17        
(0.80)
0.96         
(-0.16)
Log (State Exports) 0.74        
(-1.44)
0.75        
(-1.34)
% Employment in Exporting Firms 0.10        
(-0.84)
0.19         
(-0.58)
% Workers receiving no income 0.24        
(-0.62)
0.28         
(-0.54)       
Municipality government revenues          
($ millions of dollars)
1.004       
(1.60)
1.004        
(1.39)
Discrete Duration Model of Progam Implementation
pp y
Coefficients are reported in exponentiated form.
Table 3: Where is SARE implemented
16The results are consistent with what COFEMER ocials told us: mayors in their
second year of tenure and those who belong to the party of the President are signicantly
more likely to adopt the program in both specications. It is also true that the more
municipalities that have implemented in a state the more likely is that another municipality
in that state will adopt SARE, reinforcing our belief that SARE is implemented because a
recommendation of the governor and not as a result of a municipality specic shock. The
demographic variables are not signicant.9
Most important for us is the fact that the economic time-varying covariates are not
signicant (not even jointly) and are small economically. Overall this evidence conrms
that program adoption was not driven by changes in (time-varying) rm or job creation
and that political factors were a more important determinant of program adoption.
There is no strong evidence that locations governed by certain parties where growing
faster on average. Political variables are not correlated with rm or job creation the before
SARE period: the raw correlation coecients between rm creation and party dummies
are: PAN=0.21, PRI=-0.12, PRD=-0.02 and Others=-0.02. So, while it is true that on
average PAN governs municipalities with slightly more rm creation, these municipalities
where not growing any faster on average: when we control for municipality xed eects,
the dierence in the time trends of rm creation across municipalities governed by dierent
parties are not statistically dierent from zero. Regarding tenure of the mayor in the job:
there is no reason why to expect rm creation to be related to it. This is what we nd in
the data: the correlation coecients of rm creation and dummies for year of tenure in the
before-SARE period are: 1st year=0.0003, 2nd year=0.001, 3rd year=0.0002. Overall this
evidence gives us some condence that trends in rm start-ups were not correlated with
program adoption, and therefore that the identication strategy that we use is less likely
to be awed.
5 SARE's Eect: Comparing Adopting vs
non-Adopting Municipalities
In this section we estimate the eect of SARE on rm creation in eligible industries
by comparing adopting versus non-adopting municipalities. Although these two groups of
municipalities dier signicantly in the level of rm start-ups, it turns out that we can not
9The fact that variables such as political party and number of years in oce are signicant predictors of
adoption suggest a possible instrumental-variables approach to estimating the eect of SARE. We indeed
have tried this approach using political party and years in oce, interacted with cubic time trends, as
instruments. Although the instruments were signicant in the rst stage, the SARE coecient was always
insignicant in the second stage. We never rejected the null hypothesis that SARE adoption was exogenous.
17statistically reject them following similar time trends of rm start-up before SARE was
in place. We estimate regressions where the dependent variable is rm creation in eligible
industries or the dierence in rm creation between eligible and non eligible industries,
and where explanatory variables include a separate linear time trends for the control group
and the treatment group, common monthly xed eects to control for common seasonality,
and municipality xed eects. Two control-treatment comparisons were used: Competitive
(not-yet-SARE) vs SARE municipalities, and early vs late SARE adopters. Equality of the
pre-SARE time trends for treatment and control groups was not rejected in any of these
four specications, with p-values greater than 0.5 in all cases.
Although we cannot reject that linear time trends are similar before the implementation
of the program, the main identication problem that arises when we compare municipalities
is that, after the program began to be implemented in 2002, a slowdown of the Mexican
economy was underway. According to the Mexico's Central Bank this happened partly
as a result of the US recession (Banxico (n.d.)). This deceleration was stronger in big
municipalities (measured by production or population).10 Mexico has no time series data at
the municipality level, which makes it hard to adequately control directly for the economic
trends which are unrelated to SARE. However, we try a battery of controls in the regressions
below.
We therefore suspect that, despite having similar pre-adoption trends, municipalities
that adopted SARE earlier may have experienced dierential post-SARE shocks that were
unrelated to the program itself. This fact makes comparisons across municipalities prob-
lematic: using non-SARE municipalities or late SARE adopters as a control group would
understate the eect of the program since (early) SARE municipalities are bigger. Figure
1 clearly shows this identication problem.
To anticipate results a bit, a naive dierences-in-dierences estimate using Competi-
tive municipalities as controls shows that after SARE is implemented there is a decrease
of monthly rm creation of about 5%. Our strategy in this section will therefore be to
estimate a exible model that allows for dierent time trends for dierent groups of mu-
nicipalities. We do this by interacting monthly time dummies with covariates which we
believe to proxy for the strength of the above mentioned shock. We view the sets of esti-
mates from the strategy in this section as a lower bound on the eect of SARE since we
believe that we cannot control for all omitted variables making the downturn stronger for
SARE municipalities.
10To substantiate this claim we used the Hodrick-Prescott decomposition and plotted the cyclical com-
ponents of new rm creation for early (2004) vs. late (>2004) adopters. It shows clearly that the early
adopters have stronger cycles. The raw coecients of variation for new rm creation in the pre-SARE
period are 1.06 vs. 0.93 for early vs late adopters respectively, implying that variation with respect to the























New Firm Creation by Type of Municipality
Figure 1: Mean Trends of Monthly Firm Creation by Type of Municipality
In order to understand the intuition behind the identication strategy, let Yit be the log
of one plus the number of new rms in eligible industries, where i = 1 if the municipality
implements SARE and zero otherwise.11 Let t index time and M=1 indicate municipalities
with the program. We want to estimate the treatment eect on the treated given by the
following expression: ATT  E[Y1t   Y0tjM = 1]. If SARE municipalities without the
program would have had the same mean outcomes as the control municipalities, then  in
equation 1 estimates the ATT.
Yit = i + X
0
it + AfterSAREit + it (1)
In this equation i are municipality xed eects, t are month xed eects, and AfterSAREit
is equal to 1 for municipality i after the program is implemented in that municipality and
zero before implementation.12 In all (but the rst) specications reported in table 4 in
which we use competitive municipalities as a control group, Xit includes a dummy that
identies SARE municipalities. Therefore we allow SARE municipalities to have a dierent
time trend even before program implementation. We will estimate dierent specications
by changing the controls in Xit, that is, by changing the benchmark time trends against
which the program's eect is measured.
The error in equation 1 could be correlated over time within a municipality, which
would happen if economic conditions are persistent. It can also be the case that economic
conditions within a state are similar, inducing correlation of the error terms across munic-
11In some municipalities in some months, the number of new rms is zero. For this reason we take as
the dependent variable the log of one plus the number of new rms.
12Since we have monthly data, if a SARE is operational in the middle of a month, our AfterSAREit
variable only equals one the next month. Thus, for municipalities which adopt at the beginning of the
month, SARE's eect may start a few days before being captured by our variable.
19ipalities within a state. To avoid erroneous conclusions from biases of the standard errors,
in all regressions of this paper we report standard errors clustered at the municipality level
(we also clustered at the state-year level and the results were unchanged).
Specification
 (a)  Only         
…..SARE's
  (b) SARE's and 
…..Competitive
(1)  Naïve  -0.05**       
(-2.42)
-.08***          
(-2.98)
(2)  Separate Time Trends for SARE's
-------
-0.05**          
(-2.23)
(3)  Exporting Controls -0.05**       
(-2.24)
-0.05**          
(-2.14)
(4)  Population Controls -0.03         
(-1.22)
-0.03            
(-1.26)
(5)  Time Trends by Year of Adoption -0.04         
(-1.16)
-0.04            
(-1.18)
(6)  Linear Time Trends for each SARE 
…..Municipality
-0.003        
(-0.18)
-0.01            
(-0.56)
SARE's Effect on New Firm Creation  (Comparing Municipalities)
(a) SAREs: 93 Municipalities, 99 months; 9207 obs; (b) SARE's and Competive:  239 municipalities, 
99 months = 23661 obs. Errors clustered at the municipality level.
Table 4: Comparing Eligible Firm Creation Across Municipalities:  coecients
To save on space Table 4 only presents the estimated  coecient of six specications
(rows) using two dierent sets of control municipalities (columns).13 In specication (1)
we set Xit=1. We can see that naively using common month dummies and municipality
xed eects does not control for the declining economic activity and confounds the eect of
SARE with the economic slowdown of big municipalities.14 In specication (3) Xit includes
measures of the importance of exports and `maquila' in each of the States to which the
municipality belongs. For data availability reasons these variables are dened at the State
level, not at the municipality level. Three measures where used: the percentage of the
State's GDP made up by exports, the log of total trade in dollars, and the percentage
of exports made up of `maquila' exports. These interactions were signicantly dierent
from zero but not very eective controls for the decline in economic activity of SARE
municipalities since the `After SARE' coecient is unchanged. This may be due to the
fact that municipalities within a State are very heterogeneous, making State level variables
uninformative at the municipality level.
In specication (4) Xit includes total population and the percentage of the working
population in the tertiary sector. When we use these regressors the estimated negative
eect of SARE is no longer signicantly dierent from zero. In specication (5) we formed
13Full regression results are available from the authors upon request.
14This happens also for non-eligible industries as well as for all rm-size categories.
20groups of municipalities that adopted SARE early (before 2004) or late (on or after 2004)
and assigned a dierent set of monthly dummy variables for each of these two groups. In this
case we estimate SARE's eect to be indistinguishable from zero. Finally in specication (6)
we include a municipality-specic linear time trend for adopting municipalities. Analogous
to a regression discontinuity design, the eect of SARE is identied as the break from that
linear trend. We again estimate a zero eect of SARE.
Overall, once we include interactions of time trends with covariates that control for some
of the heterogeneity between treatment and control municipalities, the eect of SARE is not
dierent from zero. As we discussed at the beginning of the section we view this estimate
as a lower bound and we devote the rest of the paper to estimating the eect of SARE by
comparing eligible versus non eligible industries instead.
6 SARE's Eect: Comparing Eligible
vs. Non Eligible Industries
Given the diculty of nding a good control group for SARE municipalities, we decided
to use comparisons within SARE municipalities across eligible and non-eligible industries
to estimate the program's eect on rm creation. The basic idea is that since only certain
industries are eligible to register through the program, the program's eect should only
be present in these industries. If SARE is eective we expect the economic decline in
eligible industries to be smaller than that in non-eligible ones just after the program is
implemented, thus increasing the gap of rm creation across industries.
This strategy allows us to control for the general (across all industries) slowdown of
economic activity after 2002, which was particularly pronounced in the larger municipal-
ities that tended to adopt SARE. Since it can be the case that eligible and non-eligible
industries have dierent time trends, what we eectively do is to compare the gap of rm
creation across industries in treated municipalities to the analogous quantity for the control





















The dependent variable Yitk is either the log of one plus the number of new rms or
the log of one plus the number of jobs created by new rms; i=1 if the municipality i has
SARE and is zero if the municipality is a control municipality; t indicates the time after
15For a paper that also uses this 3rd dierence approach see Gruber (1994).
21SARE implementation and t0 the before implementation period; k = 1 if the industry is
eligible and zero otherwise (recall that all industries have been aggregated in one of those
two categories). The rst square bracket contains the dierence of rm (or job) creation
in eligible vs. non-eligible industries in SARE municipalities. The second square bracket
contains the same quantity for control municipalities.
Eectively, our empirical strategy will attribute the relative increase in the gap of
rm creation between eligible versus non-eligible industries to the SARE program if the
gap widens by more in an adopting municipality compared to the widening in a control
municipality after the program is implemented. Thus the identication assumption is that
there is no reason other than SARE for this gap between industries to increase more for
recently adopting municipalities than for the controls (late adopters or competitive non-
SARE municipalities). Figure 2 shows the evolution of rm creation by industry eligibility
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Figure 2: Mean Trends of Firm Creation by Eligibility for SARE and Comptetitive Munic-
ipalities. "Union" denition of eligibility is used
Note that this identication assumption is weaker than the assumption used in the
simple dierences-in-dierences analysis, since the triple dierence approach is robust to
municipality-specic time-varying shocks, as long as they impact eligible and non-eligible
industries uniformly. Because of this robustness, it reduces the possible bias introduced by
the endogenous selection of municipalities.
However, as with any non-randomized program evaluation, the unbiasedness of the es-
timates is never guaranteed. If the gap in rm creation between eligible and non-eligible
industries evolves dierently in SARE and non-SARE municipalities, our identication
strategy will yield and inconsistent estimate. There are plausible stories in which this can
happen. The best story we could think about involves a) SARE municipalities being espe-
cially dependent on the US economy, b) eligible industries being composed mostly of retail
22and service non tradeables, and c) the timing of adoption to be such that more dependent
municipalities implemented rst. If this is the case, the downturn of US activity could
hit non-eligible industries harder in the early SARE municipalities, with implementation
happening just when the eect becomes stronger, thus widening the gap between industries
more in the rst SARE municipalities.
In section 6.2 we present some evidence showing that there is no before-SARE trend
in the gap of rm creation, and that the eect seems to be present only in new creation
of small rms and not on employment in existing rms, making it less likely that this
alternative story biases our results. The fact that our results are robust to the denition
of industry eligibility is also encouraging since the eect is less likely to be an artifact of
some industry outliers. In any case, if this alternative story is true our estimates would
overestimate SARE's positive eect. Since we will later argue that SARE's eect is not
big anyway in spite of our possible overestimation, this alternative story strengthens our
conclusion.
Industry Variable Adjacent Competitive Other SARE
  New Firms 31 12 4 9
  New Jobs by New Firms 16 49 9 213
  Current Employment 1,686 5,265 718 28,055
  Non-Exiting Firms 77 228 40 1,122
  New Firms 31 22 5 3
  New Jobs by New Firms 9 36 4 174
  Current Employment 1,532 6,257 646 33,490
  Non-Exiting Firms 141 534 76 2,542
Sample period 1998-2000. We use the union definition of eligibility.





















Table 5: Means of selected variables for Eligible and Non-Eligible Industries
Before proceeding to the estimation, Table 5 shows some summary statistics comparing
eligible and non-eligible industries in SARE municipalities. It shows that eligible industries
are slightly bigger in terms of new rm creation, current total employment and the number
of stable (non-exiting) rms (rms that had registered employees last month and in the
current month). They are a bit smaller in terms of jobs created by new rms, implying
that the average new rm in non-eligible industries has about 4 employees compared to 3
for eligible ones.
We will use the following regression to estimate the eect of SARE:
Yikt = ik+t+AfterSAREitIk+AfterSAREit+(t)Ik+SAREiIk+Xit+itk (3)
The eect of SARE is captured by  which is the coecient of the interaction of the
23eligible industry dummy, the `after implementation' dummy and the SARE municipality
dummy. This estimates the eect dened in equation 2. The coecients ik are xed eects
for each municipality-industry pair. The coecients t are xed eects for each month.
The remaining regressors are the second order interactions between industry, municipality
and time, and some controls.
The parameter  captures the shift of the outcome variable which is common for both
types of industries for SARE municipalities after SARE is implemented; this regressor is
key to control for the decreasing trend of rm creation in SARE municipalities which occurs
around 2002. The term (t) is a third degree polynomial of time interacted with the eligible
industry dummy, it captures the time trend dierences for eligible relative to non-eligible
industries which is common to all municipalities (SARE municipalities before implemen-
tation and non-SARE municipalities); the parameter  estimates the average dierence in
levels of rm creation (job creation) of eligible industries in SARE municipalities. Dierent
specications for Xit will be explored on Section 6.3, in this section we do not include Xit
in the regressions.
In Table 6 the estimations will be done for four samples dened by whether the control
group includes Competitive municipalities or not, and by the denition of industry eligibil-
ity used.16 To save on space we will only report the estimates for the eect of the program,
although the full regression results are available upon request.
Panel A of Table 6 shows eight  estimates from equation 3. The columns dene the
group used as a control for each of the two denitions of industry eligibility; the rows present
the results for dierent dependent variables: new rms and new jobs in those new rms.
All the estimated coecients imply that SARE had a positive and statistically signicant
eect. This eect is robust to the denition of industry eligibility.
In the sample that uses only SARE municipalities the eect of the program is a 4% to 5%
increase in rm creation. In this sample the implicit control group is late SARE adopters.
When we include all Competitive municipalities as controls the estimated eect is 9%.17
16Since we were not able to obtain the list of eligible industries for all municipalities, we were forced
to extrapolate to 93 municipalities using the lists of 31 of them. This may induce a measurement error
problem which could bias the estimated eect downwards. Since we were assured by COFEMER that
municipalities within a State tend to copy the industry eligibility lists of each other, we ran the same
regressions extrapolating the \union" denition within each State. The 31 municipalities with lists cover
16 States, which in turn have 47 SARE municipalities. We only used these municipalities in the regressions
and the resulting coecients are quite similar to those reported in the tables. Since we are using fewer
municipalities, however, the p-values rise to about 0.19. We take the fact that the estimated coecients
are similar using this state-wide extrapolation method as some evidence against a measurement error
problem. However given the smaller statistical signicance, we cannot condently discard the possibility
of a downward bias of our estimates due to measurement error.
17We found a statistically signicant coecient (not shown in table) on the rst order term of the
24Panel A: Start-ups and New Jobs
Dependent Variable Union       Intersection    Union       Intersection    
log (New Jobs in New Firms)
0.08**      
(2.2)
0.07*        
(1.8)
0.11***     
(3.02)
0.08**        
(2.2)
log (New Firms)
0.04**      
(2.08)
0.05**       
(2.2)
0.09***     
(4.09)
0.09***      
(4.9)
Panel B: Firm Survival (Cox model)
Coefficient Estimates Union       Intersection    Union       Intersection    
Including size measure
-0.33***    
(-4.48)
-0.25***     
(-3.23)
-0.24***    
(-2.98)




SARE's Differential Effect on Eligible Industries
Only SARE's
a SARE's and Competitive
b
(a) 93 Municipalities, 99 months; 9207 obs; (b) 239 municipalities, 99 months = 23661 obs. Errors clustered at the municipality 
level. (c) Sample: 50,000 new firms in SARE municipalities, 99 months,  time at risk: 966,415 months. We report results for the 





Table 6: SARE's eect
The eect on job creation by new registered rms is generally twice as big: an increase of
8% to 11%. This is important since it implies that after the program is implemented the
new rms being registered are bigger. The estimates translate into 12 to 19 more jobs and
2 to 5 more rms per municipality per month.18
In Panel B of Table 6 we report an estimate of the eect of SARE on the length of
life of start-up rms. To do this we have to work with rm-level information and the
computational burden is high. For the models in which only the SARE municipalities are
included, we extracted a simple random sample of 50,000 new rms out of the 925,002
new rms that registered with IMSS during our sample period in SARE municipalities
(2,073,503 registered in all municipalities).
The mean life of a rm in our sample is 19 months and 37,215 of the 50,000 start-up
rms exit during our sample period. The hazard of exit is decreasing for both eligible and
non eligible industries as shown in Figure 4 in the Appendix, conrming in our sample
a well established fact in the economic's literature (see for example Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson (1988)): older rms are less likely to exit even conditional on having reached
that age.
For the hazard models in which we include SARE municipalities and competitive munic-
relative industry time trends (the  function) of about 0.004 more new rms per month. We believe that
this non-SARE increase in the gap is not big enough to cast doubt on our estimate.
18To give a sense of the rest of the coecients we report them here along with their standard errors
for the regression of new rms in \only SARE's" for the union denition, although their magnitudes are
consistent across specications:  = -.09 (-3.55);  =-.37 (-15.26); the linear, quadratic and cube terms of
 are the following respectively: .004 (2.24), -.00006 (-1.52), 4.730e-07 (1.70).
25ipalities, we extracted a simple random sample of 30,000 start-up rms from a population
of 1,284,920. We used fewer rms because the hazard models needed to include more than
twice as many municipality dummies. The descriptive statistics for these 30,000 start-up
rms are similar to those reported in the previous paragraph.
If SARE's main eect is through the formalization of already existing rms, we would
expect that the probability of rm survival in eligible industries changes after SARE is im-
plemented. In particular, we would expect that they live longer after SARE is implemented
since the apparently new rms are really older rms that have now decided to register with
the Social Security. Since older rms have lower exit hazards, the \new" rms formalized as
a result of SARE would have exit hazard rates closer to those of older rms, and therefore
live longer than the typical newly-registered rm. However a nding like this one will by
no means show that the registration increase is driven by registering informal rms.
We estimated a Cox duration model with proportional hazard h(t) = h0(t)  exp(X0).
The specication we use for the regressors X0 is given by equation 3. Again our coecient
if interest is : it measures the relative change in the hazard of exit of eligible vs. non
eligible industries after SARE is implemented. Since we have already shown that new start-
ups have more employees, an additional control variable included in the duration model is
the number of workers in the rm in each month, in this sense we are looking at the eect
on SARE conditional on rm size. Again we cluster standard errors at the municipality
level.
The coecient estimate for the union denition, using only SARE municipalities, im-
plies that after SARE is implemented, new start-up eligible rms increase their lives by
28% ([exp(-0.33)-1]*100) relative to their non-eligible counterparts (22% for the intersec-
tion denition). We interpret this evidence as being consistent with the hypothesis that at
least some of SARE's eect works through the formalization of rms that had already been
operating prior to the program's implementation. The results are similar when using the
30,000 rm sample that includes non-SARE competitive municipalities as controls. The
point estimates, presented in the right side of Panel B, are a bit smaller but the qualitative
result is unchanged. Once again, we interpret the fact that post-SARE start ups in eligible
industries tend to live longer as evidence that these start ups were really existing rms that
had been operating formally.
The fact that the estimated eects are very similar for both denitions of eligibility,
both for the models of rm creation and for the duration models, gives us more condence
that municipalities are not selecting which industries to include in their program based on
expectations of their growth, and that this selection is not driving our results.
We now return to the estimates on rms creation. The estimated eect of SARE on
rm creation seems big if it can be sustained permanently, especially considering that the
26country's GDP has grown close to 2% from 1988 to 2003. But, is this a permanent increase
in the rate of rm creation or just a once and for all shift of the stock of informal rms now
being registered? Answering this question would require accurate time series measures of
the size of the informal sector at the municipality level. These data do not exist and we
are therefore unable to answer this important question.  
 





























































































Coefficients 5% CI 5% CI
 .
Figure 3: Firm Registration Before and After SARE (Includes only SARE municipalities
using the \union" denition)
Figure 3 investigates the dynamics of rm registration. We estimated an specication
where the eect of SARE is decomposed in months before and after implementation by
interacting the `SARE eect' term in equation 3 with monthly dummies. We plot these
coecients in Figure 3 along with their 5% condence intervals. One can see that the eect
of SARE is temporary, being more important from the 3rd to the 10th month after its im-
plementation. The relative sizes of the coecients seem sensible, and more importantly, we
observe no clear previous trend before SARE: the coecients are not statistically dierent
from zero.19 We would like to stress the fact that the non existence of a prior trend is
strong evidence that our estimated eect is not the result of a general dierence in time
trends across industries unrelated to SARE, especially since the program is implemented
across all the sample period in dierent geographical regions.
There are many potential explanations for this temporary increase in rm registration.
The following is a partial list of these explanations: a) an existing stock of existing informal
rms or entrepreneurs decide to register or create new rms once registration costs decrease,
19There are several reasons to expect either a decreasing or an increasing trend very close to adoption:
(a) in the two or three months before implementation COFEMER ocials are around evaluating the
municipality procedures and we should expect an increase in speed of registration and a reduction on the
backlog and thus an increase in registration; (b) there could be some media coverage of the fact that it
is easier to register rms, thus increasing the demand for formal licences; (c) some potential clients could
withhold their application for a few weeks until SARE is operational, thus decreasing registration before
SARE.
27and this shows up as an jump in the ow of registration. b) as new rms enter and rents
are competed away the rate of entry slows down. c) the program was better publicized
when it was rst implemented. Although we have no data on advertising, ocials tell
us that the marketing eort was minimal. d) The eect is driven by the changing set of
municipalities acting as \controls" as time passes: we have data 10, 20 and 30 months after
implementation for 53, 20 and 8 SAREs respectively.
6.1 Eect on Competition: Price Level
Although we estimate the extra number of registered rms in a SARE municipality to
be at most ve per month, in this section we inquire if SARE has eects in competition
as reected in the price level. Bruhn (2006) estimated that SARE decreased the price
level by approximately 1% using the same price data that we have but including fewer
municipalities. Table 7 reports the estimated SARE eect on the log price level for four
regressions: the two columns on the left compare the price level across municipalities before










After SARE -0.003         
(-0.56)
-0.001         
(-0.14)
-0.008         
(-1.07)
-0.007         
(-1.08)
Number of observations 4,554 2,871 9,108 5,742
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.98
Dif-in-Dif Dif-in-Dif-in-Diff
Notes: both models use data from January 1998 through March 2006. Models also include dummies for each the 99
months during this period. There is disaggregated price data for 46 cities which include 29 SARE's. Industry
classification: Eligible: Food, clothing, shoes, clothing accessories and tailoring, furniture and domestic appliances,
cleaning accessories, personal health products, recreation. Non Eligible: Alcoholic drinks and tobacco, cost of housing,
electricity and fuels, other services related to housing, health care, public transport, private transport, education.
Price Level Effects of SARE
.
Table 7: Eect of SARE on Consumer Prices
The two columns on the right compare changes across eligible vs non-eligible industries
using specication 3.20 Banco de Mexico only reports prices for 46 cities, 29 of which had
implemented SARE during our sample period. We report results using both: only SARE
municipalities and using all cities which includes non-SARE cities as controls. The results
in the four specications show that SARE had no signicant eect on prices.
20We classied 8 industries as eligible for SARE and the remaining 8 as non-eligible, making them as
compatible as possible with our previous denition. Table 7 lists our classication.
286.2 Specication Checks
Are we really identifying a causal eect? If the slower decline of rm creation in eligible
industries is due to SARE we would expect this eect not to be present in new job creation
in existing rms or new big rm creation.21 We would also expect the program to be more
eective where it most reduced the time and cost of rm registration. We provide some
evidence of these below.
Dependent Variable
(1) log (New Jobs in Old .Firms)
(2) log (New Firms)                     
…..# employees > 10
Dependent Variable
<23 >=23 <3.5 >=3.5
log (New Firms)   0.016     
(0.05)
0.03        
(0.88)
0.02      
(0.69)
0.04       
(1.03)
0.05                
(1.3)
0.04                
(1.3)
Panel A: SARE's  Effect on Different Economic Outcomes
Intersection          
*Includes only SARE municipality and uses the union definition.
Number of procedures 
difference
Number of days 
difference
Panel B: SARE's  Effect by size of the change brought by SARE*
0.04                 
(1.2)
0.003                
(0.09)
Union                
.
Table 8: Specication Checks: SARE's eect on Big Firm Creation and Jobs on Existing
Firms and Eect by Size of change of Practices
Table 8 shows the estimated \SARE eect" on dierent dependent variables using
specication 3. In the rst row of Panel A the dependent variable is the log of job creation in
existing rms, that is, rms that already had registered employees in the prior month. The
estimates show that job creation in already registered rms does not increase signicantly
after SARE implementation. The second row of Panel A estimates the same equation 3
but using only start-up rms with more than 10 employees as the dependent variable. We
expect SARE to have a smaller eect when looking at bigger rms since it is less likely
that such a rm could be registered through the program. This is indeed what we nd: no
eect.
Another check that would increase our condence that the estimated eect is causal
would be to test if it is bigger where SARE changed existing practices the most; this
is what we do in Panel B. We obtained information from COFEMER on the number of
procedures and time it took to register a rm before and after SARE. Information was
21Jobs created in continuing rms is about ve times bigger than jobs created by new rms. Regarding
the contribution to new rm creation by sizes: approximately 85% of new rms are smaller than ve
employees. Recall that SARE is aimed at small rms: most SARE's have restrictions on the maximum
number of square meters of the new locale.
29available for 41 of the 93 SARE municipalities. In these municipalities it took an average
of 28 days to register a rm and obtain the operation licence (with a minimum of 2 and
a maximum of 60 days). It also took an average of 6 procedures (with a minimum of 1
and a maximum of 7). We divided the sample of 41 municipalities according to the median
change in these variables before and after SARE. The median dierence of the number of
procedures is 3.5 and the median dierence of the number of days is 23. We ran a regression
to estimate equation 3 for municipalities above the median and another for those below the
median for both of our measures. The results appear in Panel B.
The estimates are not statistically signicant at the 10% level, maybe due to the much
smaller size of the sample, but the size of the SARE eect is twice as big where the burden
was reduced more, and the t-statistic is also much higher. This implies that the gap of rm
creation in eligible relative to non eligible industries increased more after the program's
implementation for those municipalities where SARE had a bigger eect on the burden of
regulation.
This evidence increases our condence that our estimated SARE eect is not capturing
general economic activity unrelated to the program, since this general economic activity not
only would have to happen just after the program is implemented, but also be concentrated
on jobs in new rms and not on jobs in existing rms. It is hard to come up with an
alternative story that matches all these facts. Based on this evidence we think that our
causal interpretation is supported by the data.
6.3 Additional Controls and Caveats
We believe we have gathered substantial evidence that our estimated eect is causal.
Here we show that SARE's eect is robust to the inclusion of monthly measures of economic
activity at the municipality level and to the inclusion of dierent time-industry trends. In
particular we will allow for a dierent set of time trends for municipalities with similar time
of adoption, similar percentages of rm creation in eligible vs. non-eligible industries, and
similar dependence on trade. In this case identication comes from deviations from these
group specic trends after the municipality implements the program. In other words, the
counterfactual time trends are allowed to depend on observable municipality characteristics.
It will turn out that the estimated eect is robust to which of these dierent counterfactual
time trends we use to benchmark SARE's eect.
Panel A of table 9 presents estimates of SARE's eect for four specications. We use
equation 3 but introduce extra controls as explained below. Our results are unchanged in
all of these alternatives.
In specication (1) we included three monthly municipality-industry level regressors:
job creation in existing rms, the number of rms that shut down, and average new rm
30creation in adjacent municipalities.22 A general decline in economic activity in the mu-
nicipality or in the neighboring region unrelated to SARE should be captured by these
regressors. Additionally we introduce 99 monthly dummies interacted with the eligible in-
dustries dummy and also monthly dummies interactions with the \AfterSARE" regressor
to allow for a dierential eect of economic activity across time. The estimated eect is
now 0.033 instead of 0.04.
For specication (2) we allowed those municipalities who implemented the program
early (in 2002, 2003 or 2004) to have a dierent industry time trend than the late adopters
(2005 and 2006) by creating two dierent sets of monthly dummies for these groups and
interacting them with an industry eligibility dummy. If the eect of SARE is a spurious
eect caused by the bigger early adopters having a larger increase in the gap between
industries than the later adopters controls, then introducing dierent benchmark time
trends for these should eliminate this eect. It turns out that the eect not only does not
disappear, but it is estimated to be bigger.
In specication (3), to compute a measure of industry composition, for each municipality
we calculated the percentage of rm creation (from 1998 to 2001) that happened in eligible
industries. We then identied municipalities by quartiles of this measure and allow each
quartile group to have its own set of monthly dummies. Finally in specication (4) we
introduced a time dummies*industry*trade interaction, eectively allowing time trends of
rm creation in each industry type to dier by the level of dollar exports of the state, the
percentage of employees working in exporting companies, and the percentage of exports
made by maquila. If changes in the industry composition of rm creation are driven by a
slowdown of the US economy, then allowing for high trade States to have dierent trends,
or dierent trends by the previous share of rms in eligible industries, will eliminate the
eect attributed to SARE since the timing of implementation per se should not have an
impact when measured against the benchmark of municipalities with a similar industry
composition. In all specications the eect is still present.
What we do in Panel B is to see if the eect of the program is stronger in municipalities
that had lower rm start-ups before 2002 or a higher percentage of informal workers,
and whether the eect is dierent for \competitive" municipalities. The rst specication
estimates the eect of SARE by quartiles of average (1998-2001) rm creation. It shows that
the program had a bigger impact on municipalities that had lower pre-SARE rm creation.
One explanation for this nding is that these municipalities had low rm creation in the
rst place because of the high registration burden. Note that this does not square well with
the alternative `decrease in exports' story alluded in Section 6 since bigger municipalities
22For each SARE we identied its neighboring municipalities and associated to that SARE the average




(2) Separate Industry Trends Interactions 
…..for Early and Late Adopters
(3) Industry Trends Interacted with Trade 
…..Variables 
(4) Monthly dummies interacted with 
…..Industry
(1) By quartiles of New Firms 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
   ... log (New Firms) 0.10*       
(1.86)
0.09*      
(1.74)
0.0001    
(1.36)
-0.01       
(-0.26)
(2) Interacted with the proportion of the population with IMSS
Main Effect Interaction
   ...log (New Firms) 0.06*       
(2.28)
-0.005     
(-0.55)
(3) Separate regressions for Competitive and Non-Competitive SARE municipalities
Competitive Non- Competitive
   ...log (New Firms) 0.042*      
(1.73)
0.08***               
(3.04)
0.09***              
(3.23)
0.07*                 
(1.7)    
0.04*                
(1.68)
0.054**              
(2.38 )
Union                  Intersection            
Panel A: Robustness Checks
0.03*                 
(1.74)
0.041*               
(1.97)
.039**                
(1.97)
0.035               
(0.94)
Panel B: SARE's Effect Heterogeneity
Regresions include only SARE municipalities and uses the union definition.  There are 62 competitive SARE municipalties are and 31 
non-competitive SAREs. .
Table 9: Robustness of SARE's Eect
are the ones who export the most.
The second specication looks for an interaction of the eect of SARE and the percent-
age of the working population not enrolled with the labor authorities (that is, registered
with IMSS). We expected to nd that SARE's eect is bigger in municipalities with lower
enrollment (more informality) but we did not nd a signicant interaction.
The third specication looks at the eect of SARE separately for competitive vs. non-
competitive municipalities. Recall that competitive municipalities where explicitly invited
by the federal government whereas non-competitive municipalities were not. In section 4.1
we argued and showed some evidence that the selection of municipalities by the federal
government and the timing of SARE adoption is likely to be uncorrelated to the outcome
variable since it was driven mostly by political reasons. If this is true then we would expect
that the eect of SARE to be similar for competitive and non competitive municipalities.
This is indeed what we nd: the eect is 4.2% in competitive municipalities and 3.5% in
non-competitive ones. However in the sample of non competitive SARE adopters, which
contains only 31 of them, the eect is not statistically signicant at conventional levels.
326.3.1 Caveats
One general criticism of the dierences-in-dierences methodology is that treatment
may aect the non-treated units through general equilibrium eects. In our case general
equilibrium eects could lead to both under and over-estimation of the program's eect. For
example: a) rm creation in non eligible industries may increase, say, from spill over eects
of the eligible industries using inputs from the non-eligible sector, leading to a decrease
in the gap of rm creation and thus an underestimate of the SARE's eect; or b) rm
creation may decrease in non eligible industries because, by making it easier for rms to
register, SARE may creates more competition from close (eligible) products, leading to an
overestimation of the eect.
Although we cannot rule out any of the general equilibrium critiques (nor can most
published papers) we think that their eects are likely to be negligible. The story in part
b) is very unlikely to hold since industry eligibility is dened at the 4 digit level (in the
IMSS data) and therefore encompasses almost all kinds of similar industries. This makes
it relatively hard to nd substitute products in both eligible and non eligible industries.
Against the story in part a), we can only point out that the program is not very big and
its eect was estimated to be temporary. Recall that the main eligible industries are in
retail and services: it is hard to imagine that having a few more stores will have important
backward (supply) linkages spurring the creation of risky manufacturing rms like chemicals
or highly polluting industries.
Concerns about the external validity of our estimates are obviously very important,
especially given our very limited knowledge of the determinants of new rm start-ups and
the desire to implement these programs in many countries. Our estimates are of course
estimates of the Treatment Eect on the Treated, and because we believe that many factors
could inuence the program's eect, we cannot claim that the results of this program carry
over to any other country or similar type of procedure.
7 When is SARE More Eective?
The estimated eect of SARE is much smaller than the 20% increase in start-ups that
the Doing Business Report documents for other countries who have done reforms along
the lines of SARE.23 It is also much smaller than what the Mexican government reports.
According to COFEMER, 75,168 new rms, 194,577 new jobs, and around 1,200 million
dollars of new investment had been created through SARE as of July 2006.24 According
23Their results are based only on a before/after comparisons and does not control for time trends.
24Statistics obtained from COFEMER's web page at http://www.cofemer.gob.mx/portal.asp? selec-
cionID=66&padreID=10&hijoID=22.
33to our estimates, the counterfactual number of rms created by SARE is closer to 4,029
(1,343 municipality-months*3 rms per month), which is 5% of the number the authorities
report. Our counterfactual estimate of number of jobs created by new rms is 25,517 (1,343
municipality-months*19 rms per month), which is 13% of the ocial number.25
It is hard to argue that there has not been enough time for these reforms to have their
eect. The data captures rm start-ups up to almost four years after implementation for
some municipalities. This should be enough time to see an eect. More importantly, the
eect we estimate shows up immediately and only last for about a year. The interesting
question thus is why is the eect smaller than expected? In this section we provide some
informed discussion about it and attempt to shed some light on this important issue.
While it is true that SARE signicantly reduced the time and number of municipal
procedures. Recall that the time reduction caused by SARE is on average 28 days which,
as mentioned earlier, is comparable to the dierence in delay between Jamaica and
Canada. However it is still the case that some important procedures must be performed
outside the SARE oces. 26
The Doing Business Group conducted a survey in 32 Mexican municipalities in 2006
where the time and cost of the above procedures was quantied; 26 of these municipalities
adopted SARE during our sample period. They sent surveys to an average of three law
rms per city and the city government in which the time and cost of these and other
procedures was ascertained.27 It turns out that the cost and timeliness to complete these
procedures excluding obtaining an operation licence (SARE's procedure) is not negligible
and varies widely across cities: the average cost is around $980 dollars with a standard
deviation of $390; they take on average 23 days to complete with a standard deviation of
11. Variation in the number of cost and days to perform these procedures is therefore non
negligible. Although there are additional procedures which SARE left untouched, we want
to emphasize that SARE did reduce the administrative burden of registration to a great
25Back of the envelope calculations reported in previous versions of the paper suggest that SARE would
only decrease by 0.2% the size of the informal sector.
26Before going to SARE the entrepreneur has to 1) register the name of the company with the Ministry
of Foreign Aairs, 2) legalize the company's statutes (in case it is a limited liability company), 3) register
statutes with the public registry of commerce, 4) register with the Federal Taxpayers Registry (RFC). After
obtaining the operation licence with SARE the entrepreneur still has to 5) register with the Social Security
(IMSS); 6) register to pay payroll tax, 7) register with the System of Business Information (SIEM) and 8)
register with the Mexican Statistical Institute (INEGI).
27The survey requests its respondents to answer questions with respect to a particular kind of model
company: a domestically owned limited liability company with 5 owners and start up capital of 10 time the
GDP of the respective state. To the extent that costs are similar for dierent types of companies within a
city this information should be useful. For more information on their methodology, data and results of the
survey consult the World Bank's Doing Business web site.
34extent cutting the delays more than half. Therefore the small estimated eect of SARE
can not be attributed to a weak reform.
Since these additional procedures are complements to SARE we should expect SARE
to have a smaller eect where the cost of the additional procedures is greater. In other
words, SARE decreases the total burden by a smaller proportion in locations where the
burden of the other procedures is high. To test this hypothesis we interact the SARE eect
coecient with the cost of these extra procedures.
Main Effect Interaction
Cost of other Procedures
a 0.02***      
(3.53)
-0.03***    
(-3.01)
Corruption in Zoning Restriction
b 0.021**      
(2.70)
-0.016*     
(-1.82)
Possible Explanations for the Small SARE effect
a Includes the 26 SARE municipalities for which the Doing Business in Mexico Report 
provides information. 
b To have a consistent sample, we imputed the State values to the 26 
municipalities that have Doing Business data and used only those municipalities.
Table 10: Some Possible Determinants of the Eect of SARE
To get a measure of relative cost of performing the non-SARE procedures we divided
the this cost by the cost in the most expensive municipality. So our measure of additional
cost is between 0 and 1. It has a mean of 0.47 and a standard deviation of 0.18. As the
rst line of table 10 shows the interaction is negative: SARE has a lower eect in those
municipalities where the burden of other registration procedures is high. A decrease of the
extra cost from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile (that is, by about $460 dlls, 0.23
in our relative cost measure), is associated with an increase of SARE's eect of 35%.28
One important cost of being registered is complying with a series of health and safety
regulations. Anecdotal evidence indicates that at this stage bureaucrats try to nd any
minor non-compliance in order to extract bribes. SARE delays these revisions for three
months but does not eliminate them. If bribe extraction is high, entrepreneurs will be
reluctant to register and make their location known to inspectors. Unfortunately the Doing
Business indicators do not include a measure of the pervasiveness of corruption at this stage.
However, Transparency International has conducted a survey in Mexico on the cor-
ruption involved in asking for a zoning permit (\uso de suelo").29 In order to obtain the
operational licence, the rm must rst obtain a zoning permit that demonstrates that the
28Using the number of days we also get signicant and qualitatively similar results.
29Their survey is not representative at the municipal level. The data are reported at the State level,
however the main cities, which are typically the SARE cities, are much more represented. Because of this
results should be treated with caution. For more information see their web page.
35rm complies with all zoning restrictions. Transparency International reports the percent-
age of the time that the interviewed households reported giving a bribe when asking for this
zoning permit. It turns out that the national average for 2001 (for about 15,000 households)
is 10.1%.
We expect SARE to have a smaller eect in States with more corruption in the pre-
requirements for using SARE. We interact the variable measuring the percentage of bribes
regarding \uso de suelo" in a State with the SARE eect variable. Results are reported in
the second row of Table 10. The interaction shows that SARE is less eective in States with
more \corrupt" zoning permit procedures: one standard deviation increase in the percent
of bribes (6%) decreases the eect of SARE from 2% to 1%.
We have discussed how dierent costs may be reducing the eect of SARE on new rm
start-ups. Additionally the benets of registering with the government authorities may be
low. The most often mentioned benet is access to credit. However, given that collateral
is hard to register and verify, credit may be hard to obtain. The Doing Business Report on
Mexico calculated an index of the ease of creating and registering collateral that intends to
measure \the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending". The index
ranges from 0 to 10 with higher scores indicating that existing laws promote the extension
of credit. The report also provides information about the cost and time it takes to register
collateral. We interacted each of these variables with the SARE eect variable and found
the interaction to be statistically not dierent from zero.
The above regressions do not establish any causal eects; furthermore we have no strat-
egy to separately identify the eect of corruption from, say, the eect of extra costs. Besides
the small sample size, there may be problems of omitted variables (e.g. institutional char-
acteristics) that are correlated with corruption, extra registration costs, ease to register
collateral and SARE eectiveness. However the correlations presented are useful to have
an more informed discussion. We think that additional procedures, corruption and omit-
ted factors closely correlated with them can be interpreted as measures of complementary
institutional quality. And the picture that emerges from the above regressions is that they
can hinder the eectiveness of SARE.
To gain a better understanding of the barriers of starting and managing a small rm
in Mexico we used the National Survey to Small Firms (ENAMIN) produced by Mexico's
Statistical Institute (INEGI). This survey is conducted at the households in 45 main urban
areas in Mexico, and has a target population of rms with less than 6 employees (or 16 if
the rm is in the manufacturing sector).30 We use the latest (2002) survey which contains
11,306 respondents.
The rm owners were asked about how they nanced their start-up rm; 40% said it
30For more information about this survey consult www.inegi.gob.
36was from personal savings, 11.4% said friends lent them, 20.5% said they did not need
money to start, and 1.5% used trade credit. Only 0.5% of these entrepreneurs borrowed
from commercial banks. This may mean that access to credit for small rms is dicult,
but it may also mean that the demand for bank credit is low. If it were the former then
we should expect credit to be a big problem in the operation of a small business. These
entrepreneurs were asked which is the main problem facing their business; 49.4% replied
that it was lack of customers or strong competition, 12.5% said they had no problems, 3.8%
said that credit was a problem, and only 1% said government authorities were a problem.
Even though rms in the sample are a selection of rms that could start-up a business,
the proportion of entrepreneurs who report problems of access to credit or dealing with
authorities is surprisingly low.
The fact that entrepreneurs say that competition and lack of customers is their main
problem suggests that we have to take seriously the possibility that human capital or en-
trepreneurial ability could play a signicant role in limiting the eect of programs like
SARE. The surveyed entrepreneurs may not be good at developing and marketing new
ideas. Djankov, Quian, Ronald and Zhuravskaya (2006b) provide some evidence that en-
trepreneurs dier signicantly from non-entrepreneurs in their attitudes towards risk and
work-leisure preferences, as well as in their social environment. Another possibility to con-
sider is the stage of development on the demand side: consumers in less developed countries
may spend a big part of their income on basic needs, which may limit the sale of some new
products or services.
Still another possible explanation for the small estimated eect of SARE is that not
all new rms register in our data set, that is, with the labor authorities. A requirement
for starting the SARE registration procedure is to register with the tax authorities, and
only 3 months after obtaining the operation licence through SARE is the entrepreneur
required to register with the labor authorities. It is possible that they illegally skip this
later requirement. But to what extent can this happen?
In order to achieve the 20%-plus increase in rm start-ups that the World Bank re-
ports for other countries, more than three quarters of the rms that register with the tax
authorities would have to avoid registration with the labor authorities. This seems highly
unlikely. To substantiate this claim we used the ENAMIN survey again. It asks two sepa-
rate questions on whether the rm is registered with the tax and/or the labor authorities.
It turns out that only 28% of the rms registered with the tax authorities said they are
not registered with the labor authorities. If we believe this number SARE's eect would
maybe be 5% of 6% instead of 4%, that is, almost not change. Thus we believe that this is
not the right explanation for the small SARE eect.
The discussion in this section can only be suggestive. As mentioned above, the sample
37of municipalities used is small and, more importantly, there may be omitted variables
driving some of the reported correlations. However we have raised issues that should matter
for policy makers trying to implement this type of programs: the burden of additional
procedures, taxes and the overall institutional environment will have an impact on their
eectiveness.
8 Conclusion
Policy makers around the world are investing considerable eort in decreasing the num-
ber of procedures and the time to register a rm. The expectations for these reforms include
increased rm start-ups, decreased informality, and increased tax revenues. Nevertheless,
there has been scant evidence on their eectiveness.
This paper presents evidence that reducing the costs of obtaining an operation licence
can in fact lead to increased formal rm creation. We also nd, however, that the eects of
the program we studied were temporary and of a relatively modest magnitude. Since the
costs of the program have also been quite low, the program may well have been cost eective.
However, we believe the program we study has not lived up to the lofty expectations of
some. We conjecture that this is due in part to the burden of complementary procedures
and overall institutional quality. A more inclusive program could have a much bigger eect
on rm start-ups.
We conclude by mentioning that burdensome registration regulations may not be the
only important barrier to rm creation or rm formalization. Instead the cost of paying
taxes may still outweigh the benets of registering, especially since credit was scarce during
this period and the cost of enforcing contracts is still high in Mexico. We also pointed to
the fact that publicity about the program may be important. To the extent that a poorly
functioning tax system, a poorly functioning credit market, corruption, or other institutions
are relevant, additional (possibly complementary) policies addressing these problems should
be considered in addition to reform programs like the one we studied.
389 Appendix: Additional Tables
Table 11 shows the names and industry eligibility status of the 30 biggest IMSS indus-
tries in terms of rm creation during our sample period. It gives an idea of the level of
aggregation with which IMSS classies industries.
Industry Description Intersection Union Non Eligible
Construction of building (except public works) 0 0 1
Profesional and technical services 1 1 0
Preparation of food and food services 1 1 0
Retail stores of food and brevages 0 1 0
Mechanic, services of repair of vehicles 0 0 1
Load transport 0 1 0
Retail stores of clothes and clothing accessories 0 1 0
Passenger transport 0 1 0
Plumbing, electricity and air conditioning instalations 0 1 0
Medical services 0 0 0
Other services of remodeling, instalation or finishings of construction 0 1 0
Purchase/Sales of material for construction 0 1 0
Agriculture 0 0 1
Manufacturing of products using cereals 0 1 0
Retail stores of personal use items 1 1 0
Academic, training and cultural difusion services 1 1 0
Purchase/Sale of food, drinks (with transport) 1 1 0
Beauty saloons and hairdressers 1 1 0
Editoral, printing, bookbinding industries and connected activities 0 1 0
Manufacturing of wooden furniture and their parts 0 1 0
Purchase/Sale of food, drinks (with transport) 1 1 0
Purchase/Sale of computing equipment, with instalation 0 1 0
Manufacturing of doors, windows, ironworks 0 0 1
Instalation of windows, ironworks, and glass 0 1 0
Manufacturing of metalic products using machinery 0 0 1
Purchase/Sales of transport equipment, parts, accessories. 1 1 0
Cleaning services with motorized machinery 0 1 0
Clothing made to measure 1 1 0
Purchase/Sales of construction material, no transport 0 1 0
Retail stores of paper, stationer's shop, office supplies 1 1 0
* industries with the most firm registration in our sample period
The 30 biggest* IMSS industries by Eligiblity Status
.
Table 11: The 30 industries with more rm creation and their eligibility status







































0 20 40 60 80 100
analysis time
Non-Eligible Eligible
50,000 randomly selected new firms. The union definition of eligibility is used
By Industry Eligibility (Union)
Smoothed Exit Hazard Estimates




Athey, S. and S. Stern, \The Impact of Information Technology on Emergency Health
Care Outcomes," RAND Journal of Economics, 2002, 33 (3), 399{432.
Banxico, \Resumen Informe Anual," Webpage: www.banxico.org.mx.
Bertrand, M. and F. Kramarz, \Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence
from the French Retail Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002, 17.
Bruhn, M., \License to Sell: The Eect of Business Registration Reform on Entreprenurial
Activity in Mexico," Job Market Paper MIT, 2006.
Cabrero, E., A. Ziccardi, and I. Orihuela, \Ciudades competitivas - ciudades co-
operativas: conceptos claves y construccion de un indice para ciudades mexicanas,"
Documento de Trabajo CIDE, 2003, 139.
Djankov, S., C. McLiesh, and R. Ramalho, \Regulation and Growth," Economic
Letters, 2006, 92.
, R. La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, \The Regulation of Entry,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb 2002, CXVII (1), 1{37.
40, Y. Quian, G. Ronald, and E. Zhuravskaya, \Who Are China's Enterpreneurs?,"
American Economic Review, May 2006, 96 (2), 348{352.
Dunne, T., M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson, \Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in US
Manufacturing Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, 19 (4), 495{515.
Easterly, William, \The White's Man Burden," Penguin Press, 2006, p. 111.
Economist, The, \Measure First, Then Cut," Sept 11th 2004, p. 71.
Galiani, S., P. Gertler, and E. Schargrodsky, \Water for Life: The Impact of the
Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality," Journal of Political Economy,
2005, 113.
Gruber, J., \The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benets," American Economic Re-
view, Jun 1994, 84 (3), 622{641.
Jenkins, S., \Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration Models," Oxford Bul-
letin of Economics and Statistics, 1995, 57.
Klapper, L., L. Laeven, and R. Rajan, \Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneur-
ship," Journal of Financial Economics, 2006, 82 (3), 591{629.
Schneider, F. and D. Enste, \Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences,"
Journal of Economic Literature, 2000, XXXVIII.
Soto, H. De, The Other Path, Harper and Row: New York, 1989.
Straub, S., \Informal Sector: The Credit Market Channel," Journal of Development
Economics, 2005, 78.
WorldBank, Doing Business 2006, World Bank, 2006.
41